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Abstract
The dissemination of Electronic Health Record (EHR) data, beyond the origina-
ting healthcare institutions, can enable large-scale, low-cost medical studies that
have the potential to improve public health. Thus, funding bodies, such as the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the U.S., encourage or require the dissemi-
nation of EHR data, and a growing number of innovative medical investigations
are being performed using such data. However, simply disseminating EHR data,
after removing identifying information, may risk privacy, as patients can still be
linked with their record, based on diagnosis codes. This paper proposes the first
approach that prevents this type of data linkage using disassociation, an opera-
tion that transforms records by splitting them into carefully selected subsets. Our
approach preserves privacy with significantly lower data utility loss than existing
methods and does not require data owners to specify diagnosis codes that may
lead to identity disclosure, as these methods do. Consequently, it can be em-
ployed when data need to be shared broadly and be used in studies, beyond the
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intended ones. Through extensive experiments using EHR data, we demonstrate
that our method can construct data that are highly useful for supporting various
types of clinical case count studies and general medical analysis tasks.
Keywords: privacy, electronic health records, disassociation, diagnosis codes
1. Introduction
Healthcare data are increasingly collected in various forms, including Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHR), medical imaging databases, disease registries, and
clinical trials. Disseminating these data has the potential of offering better healt-
hcare quality at lower costs, while improving public health. For instance, large
amounts of healthcare data are becoming publicly accessible at no cost, through
open data platforms [4], in an attempt to promote accountability, entrepreneurs-
hip, and economic growth ($100 billion are estimated to be generated annually
across the US health-care system [11]). At the same time, sharing EHR data can
greatly reduce research costs (e.g., there is no need for recruiting patients) and al-
low large-scale, complex medical studies. Thus, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) calls for increasing the reuse of EHR data [7], and several medical analytic
tasks, ranging from building predictive data mining models [8] to genomic studies
[14], are being performed using such data.
Sharing EHR data is highly beneficial but must be performed in a way that
preserves patient and institutional privacy. In fact, there are several data sharing
policies and regulations that govern the sharing of patient-specific data, such as
the HIPAA privacy rule [48], in the U.S., the Anonymization Code [6], in the
U.K., and the Data Protection Directive [3], in the European Union. In addi-
tion, funding bodies emphasize the need for privacy-preserving healthcare data
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sharing. For instance, the NIH requires data involved in all NIH-funded Genome-
Wide Association Studies (GWAS) to be deposited into a biorepository, for broad
dissemination [45], while safeguarding privacy [1]. Alarmingly, however, a large
number of privacy breaches, related to healthcare data, still occur. For example,
627 privacy breaches, which affect more than 500 and up to 4.9M individuals
each, are reported from 2010 to July 2013 by the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services [15].
One of the main privacy threats when sharing EHR data is identity disclosure
(also referred to as re-identification), which involves the association of an identi-
fied patient with their record in the published data. Identity disclosure may occur
even when data are de-identified (i.e., they are devoid of identifying information).
This is because publicly available datasets, such as voter registration lists, contain
identifying information and can be linked to published datasets, based on poten-
tially identifying information, such as demographics [53], diagnosis codes [34],
and lab results [9]. The focus of our work is on diagnosis codes, because: (i) they
pose a high level of re-identification risk [34], and (ii) ensuring that diagnosis
codes are shared in a privacy-preserving way, is challenging, due to their charac-
teristics [56, 25, 28]. For example, more than 96% of 2700 patient records that
are involved in an NIH-funded GWAS were shown to be uniquely re-identifiable,
based on diagnosis codes, and, applying popular privacy-preserving methods, dis-
torts the published data to the point that they lose their clinical utility [34].
To perform identity disclosure, an attacker must possess three types of kno-
wledge: (i) a patient’s identity, (ii) a set of diagnosis codes, and (iii) whether a
patient is included in the published dataset (research sample) [36]. Knowledge of
the first two types can come in the form of background knowledge [36] or may
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be solicited by exploiting external data sources1. At the same time, knowledge of
the third type is obtainable through interaction with data subjects [19], or it can be
inferred by applying the procedure used to create the research sample from a lar-
ger patient population, which is often described in the literature [36]. To see how
identity disclosure may occur, consider the de-identified data in Fig. 1. In these
data, each record corresponds to a distinct patient and contains the set of diagnosis
codes that this patient is associated with. The description of the diagnosis codes in
Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2. An attacker, who knows that a patient is diagnosed with
Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, mild (denoted with the code 296.01) and
Closed dislocation of finger, unspecified part (denoted with 834.0), can associate
an identified patient with the first record, denoted with r1, in the data of Fig. 1, as
the set of codes {296.01, 834.0} appears in no other record. Note that the attacker
cannot perform this association, based on knowledge of either 296.01 or 834.0,
but can associate the identified patient with r1, if they know any other code or
codes, in addition to the set of codes {296.01, 834.0}. Notice also that, in this
work, we consider ICD-9 codes2, following [36, 35]. However, our approach can
be applied to other standardized codes, such as Common Procedure Terminology
(CPT) codes.
1.1. Motivation
Preventing identity disclosure based on diagnosis codes is possible by ap-
plying the methods proposed in [36, 35]. Both methods transform diagnosis codes
to ensure that the probability of performing identity disclosure, based on specified
sets of diagnosis codes, will not exceed a data-owner specified parameter k. Data
1These include publicly available voter lists combined with hospital discharge summaries [51],
or the identified EHR system available to the primary care environment [34].
2http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd9/icdguide10.pdf
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ID Records
r1 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 834.0, 944.01}
r2 {296.00, 296.02, 296.01, 401.0, 944.01, 692.71, 695.10}
r3 {296.00, 296.02, 692.71, 834.0, 695.10}
r4 {296.00, 296.01, 692.71, 401.0}
r5 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10}
r6 {296.03, 295.04, 404.00, 480.1}
r7 {294.10, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01}
r8 {294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 480.1}
r9 {294.10, 295.04, 404.00}
r10 {294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01}
Figure 1: Original dataset D.
Diagnosis code Description
294.10 Dementia in conditions classified elsewhere without behavioral disturbance
295.04 Simple type schizophrenia, chronic with acute exacerbation
296.00 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, unspecified
296.01 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, mild
296.02 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, moderate
296.03 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, severe, without mention of psychotic behavior
401.0 Malignant essential hypertension
404.00 Hypertensive heart and chronic kidney disease, malignant, without heart failure and with
chronic kidney disease stage I through stage IV, or unspecified
480.1 Pneumonia due to respiratory syncytial virus
692.71 Sunburn
695.10 Erythema multiforme, unspecified
834.0 Closed dislocation of finger, unspecified part
944.01 Burn of unspecified degree of single digit (finger (nail) other than thumb
Figure 2: Diagnosis codes in D and their description.
transformation is performed using generalization (i.e., by replacing diagnosis co-
des with more general, but semantically consistent, ones) and suppression (i.e., by
deleting diagnosis codes). Furthermore, both methods aim at transforming data in
a way that does not affect the findings of biomedical analysis tasks that the data
are intended for. These tasks are specified by data owners and used to control the
potential ways diagnosis codes are generalized and/or suppressed. For example,
applying the Clustering-Based Anonymizer (CBA) algorithm [35], which outper-
forms the method in [36] in terms of preserving data utility, to the data in Fig. 1,
produces the data in Fig. 3a. In this example, CBA was applied using k = 3 and
with the goal of (i) thwarting identity disclosure, based on all sets of 2 diagnosis
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codes, and (ii) preserving the findings of studies u1 to u5 in Fig. 3b, which re-
quire counting the number of patients diagnosed with any combination of codes
in them. Observe that the codes 294.10, 295.04, and 296.00 to 296.03 are genera-
lized to (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), which is interpreted as
any non-empty subset of these codes, and that 7 out of 13 distinct codes are sup-
pressed. The result of CBA thwarts identity disclosure (i.e., all combinations of 2
diagnosis codes appear at least 3 times in Fig. 3a) and allows performing u1 and
u3 accurately. To see why this is the case, consider u3, for example. Note that 4
patients are associated with a combination of the codes {401.0, 404.00} in u3, in
both Fig. 1 and in Fig. 3a). However, the studies u2, u4, and u5 can no longer
be performed accurately, as some of their associated diagnosis codes have been
suppressed.
ID Records
r1 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 834.0, 944.01
r2 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00), 944.01, 692.71, 695.10
r3 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 692.71, 834.0, 695.10
r4 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00), 692.71
r5 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 692.71, 695.10
r6 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00), 480.1
r7 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 834.0, 944.01
r8 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 480.1
r9 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00)
r10 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 834.0, 944.01
(a) Anonymized dataset DA produced by CBA (suppressed codes appear in gray).
ID Utility constraints
u1 {294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03}
u2 {692.71, 695.10}
u3 {401.0, 404.00}
u4 {480.1}
u5 {834.0, 944.01}
(b) Utility constraints.
Figure 3: CBA example.
In fact, the methods in [36, 35] assume a setting in which data owners possess
domain expertise that allows them to specify: (i) sets of diagnosis codes that lead
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to identity disclosure, and (ii) sets of diagnosis codes that model analytic tasks that
the published data are intended for. The ability of the published data to support
these tasks is a strong requirement, and suppression is used when this requirement
cannot be satisfied3. As can be seen in Fig. 3a, the fact that u2 = {692.71, 695.10}
was not satisfied led CBA to suppress both 692.71 and 695.10. The setting consi-
dered in [36, 35] can model some real data sharing scenarios, such as the sharing
of data between collaborating researchers, who perform specific analytic tasks
[36].
However, it is important to consider a different setting, where data are shared
more broadly and may be used for studies beyond those that are specified by
data owners. This setting becomes increasingly common, as databanks (e.g.,[2,
5]) host a wide range of patient-specific data and grow in size and popularity.
Addressing this setting calls for developing methods that offer strong privacy and
permit the publishing of data that remain useful, for analytic tasks that cannot
be predetermined, in addition to any intended ones. In fact, the aforementioned
methods [36, 35] are not suitable for this setting, because their application would
cause excessive loss of data utility, as it will become clear later.
1.2. Contributions
In this paper, we propose the first approach for the privacy-preserving sharing
of diagnosis codes under this new setting. Our approach allows data owners to
share data that prevent identity disclosure, and does not incur excessive informa-
tion loss or harm the usefulness of data in medical analysis. This work makes the
following specific contributions.
3Due to the computational complexity of the problem, no guarantees that these requirements
will be satisfied are provided by the methods in [36, 35].
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First, we develop an effective algorithm that prevents identity disclosure, ba-
sed on all sets of m or fewer diagnosis codes, by limiting its probability to 1
k
,
where k andm are data-owner specified parameters. To achieve this, the algorithm
transforms data using disassociation, an operation that splits the records into care-
fully constructed subrecords, containing original (i.e., non-transformed) diagnosis
codes. As such, disassociation can “hide” combinations of diagnosis codes that
appear few times in the original dataset, by scattering them in the subrecords of
the published dataset. For instance, consider the record r1 in Fig. 1 and its coun-
terpart, which has produced by applying disassociation with k = 3 and m = 2,
in Fig. 4. Note that the codes in r1 are split into two subrecords in Fig. 4, which
contain the sets of codes {296.00, 296.01, 296.02} and {834.0, 401.0, 944.01}, re-
spectively. Moreover, the set {834.0, 401.0, 944.01} is associated with the first 5
records in Fig. 4. Thus, an attacker who knows that a patient is diagnosed with
the set of codes {296.01, 834.00} cannot associate them with fewer than 3 records
in Fig. 4. Thus, strong privacy requirements can be specified, without knowledge
of potentially identifying diagnosis codes, and they can be enforced with low in-
formation loss. In addition, published data can still remain useful for intended
analytic tasks. For instance, as can be seen in Fig. 4, applying our algorithm to
the data in Fig. 1, using k = 3 and m = 2, achieves the same privacy, but sig-
nificantly better data utility, than CBA, whose result is shown in Fig. 3a. This is
because, in contrast to CBA, our algorithm does not suppress diagnosis codes and
retains the exact counts of 8 out of 13 codes (i.e., those in u1 and u3). Moreover,
our algorithm is able to preserve the findings of the first two studies in Fig. 3b.
Second, we experimentally demonstrate that our approach preserves data uti-
lity significantly better than CBA [35]. Specifically, when applied to a large EHR
8
dataset [8], our approach allows more accurate query answering and generates
data that are highly useful for supporting various types of clinical case count stu-
dies and general medical analysis tasks. In addition, our approach is more efficient
and scalable than CBA.
1.3. Paper organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews rela-
ted work and Section 3 presents the concepts that are necessary to introduce our
method and formulate the problem we consider. In Sections 4 and 6, we discuss
and experimentally evaluate our algorithm, respectively. Subsequently, we ex-
plain how our approach can be extended to deal with different types of medical
data and privacy requirements in Section 7. Last, Section 8 concludes the paper.
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Record chunks Item chunk
C1 C2 CT
r1 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02}
r2 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02} {692.71, 695.10} 834.0, 401.0,
r3 {296.00, 296.02} {692.71, 695.10} 944.01
r4 {296.00, 296.01} {692.71}
r5 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02} {692.71, 695.10}
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Record chunk Item chunk
C1 CT
r6 {296.03, 295.04}
r7 {294.10, 296.03} 404.00,
r8 {294.10, 295.04, 296.03} 480.1, 834.0, 944.01
r9 {294.10, 295.04}
r10 {294.10, 295.04, 296.03}
Figure 4: Anonymized dataset DA using our DISSASSOCIATION method. The dataset is compri-
sed of two clusters, and each record is comprised of a number of subrecords, called chunks.
2. Related work
There are considerable research efforts for designing privacy-preserving met-
hods [52, 49, 57, 22, 10, 23, 24, 51, 19, 44, 36]. Our work is closely related to
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methods which aim to publish patient-level data, in a way that prevents identity
disclosure. Thus, we review these methods, in Section 2.1. We also discuss diffe-
rential privacy, a privacy model that allows releasing noisy query results or noisy
data summaries, in Section 2.2.
2.1. Preventing identity disclosure
The threat of identity disclosure in medical data publishing was firstly pointed
out by Sweeney [51], and it has since attracted significant research interest [26, 19,
42, 17, 20, 18, 44]. Although other threats have been considered [41, 40, 59, 39],
“all the publicly known examples of re-identification of personal information have
involved identity disclosure” [18].
The majority of works focus on preventing identity disclosure via relational
data (i.e., data in which a patient is associated with a fixed, and typically small
number of attributes), which naturally model patient demographics, and apply
generalization [51, 53, 31] or suppression [51, 53]. Different from this line of
research, we consider data containing diagnosis codes, which require different
handling than relational data, and apply disassociation, which generally incurs
lower information loss than generalization and suppression.
Anonymizing diagnosis codes can be achieved by modeling them using a tran-
saction attribute and enforcing a privacy model for transaction data [37, 39, 28,
56, 61, 54, 38]. The value in a transaction attribute is a set of items (itemset),
which, in our case, corresponds to a patient’s diagnosis codes. In [28], He et
al. proposed a privacy model, called complete k-anonymity, and a generalization-
based algorithm, called Partition. Terrovitis et al. [56] proposed a more flexible
privacy model, called km-anonymity, and an algorithm, called Apriori. Apriori
uses an effective way of generalizing values, referred to as full-subtree, global
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generalization, which was first proposed in [29]. A suppression-based algorithm
for protecting identity disclosure was proposed in [61].
Loukides et al. [36] showed that the algorithms proposed in [28, 56, 61] are
not suited to anonymizing diagnosis codes. This is because, they explore a small
number of possible ways to anonymize diagnosis codes, and they are inadequate
to generate data that support biomedical analysis tasks. In response, they pro-
posed two algorithms; Utility-Guided Anonymization of Clinical Profiles (UGA-
CLIP) [36] and Clustering-Based Anonymizer (CBA) [35]. Both algorithms ap-
ply generalization to certain sets of diagnosis codes and aim at preserving specific
associations between diagnosis codes, which are modeled as utility constraints.
However, CBA is more effective than UGACLIP in terms of supporting the speci-
fied associations and in terms of incurring low information loss. As discussed in
Introduction, our approach is developed for a different data sharing scenario than
that of [36, 35], and it applies a different privacy model and data transformation
technique.
2.2. Preserving privacy through differential privacy
Another privacy model, called differential privacy [16], has attracted signi-
ficant attention [46, 30, 21] and has recently been applied to medical data [24].
Differential privacy ensures that the outcome of a calculation is insensitive to any
particular record in the dataset. This offers privacy, because the inferences that can
be made about an individual will be (approximately) independent of whether any
individuals record is contained in the dataset or not. Differential privacy makes
no assumptions about an attacker’s background knowledge, unlike km-anonymity,
although its enforcement does not guarantee the prevention of all attacks [12].
However, differential privacy allows either noisy answers to a limited number of
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queries, or noisy summary statistics to be released, and there are a number of
limitations regarding its application on healthcare data [13]. In addition, differen-
tially private data may be of much lower utility compared to km-anonymous data
produced by disassociation, as shown in [55].
3. Background
In the previous sections, we highlighted how a patient can be identified by
simply tracing records that contain unique combinations of diagnosis codes. Here,
we present a concrete attack model and an effective data transformation operation,
called disassociation. Disassociation can be used to guarantee patient privacy with
respect to this model, while incurring minimal data utility loss. To quantify the
loss of data utility caused by disassociation, we also discuss two measures that
capture different requirements of medical data applications.
3.1. Attack Model and Privacy Guarantee
We assume a dataset D of records (transactions), each of which contains a set
of diagnosis codes (items) from a finite domain T . The number of records in D
is denoted with |D|. Each record in D refers to a different patient and contains
the set of all diagnosis codes associated with them. An example of a dataset is
shown in Fig. 1. Each record in this dataset contains some diagnosis codes, and
the domain of diagnosis codes is shown in Fig. 2. In contrast to the traditional
attack models for relational data [41, 33], we do not distinguish between sensitive
(unknown to the attacker) and non-sensitive items in a record. Instead, we assume
that any item is a potential quasi-identifier and, hence, it may lead to identity
disclosure. Besides the dataset D we also assume a set of utility constraints U
[36], also referred to as utility policy. As discussed in Section 2, utility constraints
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model associations between diagnosis codes that anonymized data are intended
for. Each utility constraint u in U is a set of items from T , and all constraints in
U are disjoint. Fig. 3b illustrates an example of a set of utility constraints.
We now explain the attack model considered in this work. In this model, an
attacker knows up to m items of a record r in D, where m ≥ 1. The case of
attackers with no background knowledge (i.e., m = 0) is trivial, and it is easy
to see that the results of our theoretical analysis are applicable to this setting as
well. Note that, different from the methods in [36, 35], the items that may be
exploited by attackers are considered unknown to data owners. Also, there may
be multiple attackers, each of which knows a (not necessarily distinct) set of up to
m items of a record r. Other attacks and the ability of our method to thwart them
are discussed in Section 7.
Based on their knowledge, an attacker can associate the identified patient with
their record r, breaching privacy. To thwart this threat, our work employs the
privacy model of km-anonymity [56]. km-anonymity is a conditional form of k-
anonymity, which ensures that an attacker with partial knowledge of a record r,
as explained above, will not be able to distinguish r from k−1 other records in
the published dataset. In other words, the probability that the attacker performs
identity disclosure is upperbounded by 1
k
. More formally:
Definition 1. An anonymized dataset DA is km-anonymous if no attacker with
background knowledge of up to m items of a record r in DA can use these items
to identify fewer than k candidate records in DA.
For the original dataset D and its anonymized counterpart DA, we define two
transformations A and I. The anonymization transformation A takes as input
a dataset D and produces an anonymized dataset DA. The inverse transforma-
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tion I takes as input the anonymized dataset DA and outputs all possible (non-
anonymized) datasets that could produce DA, i.e., I(DA) = {D′ | DA = A(D)}.
Obviously, the original dataset D is one of the datasets in I(A(D)). To achieve
km-anonymity (Definition 1) in our setting, we enforce the following privacy gua-
rantee (from [55]).
Guarantee 1. Consider an anonymized dataset DA and a set S of up to m items.
Applying I(DA), will always produce at least one dataset D′ ∈ I(DA) for which
there are at least k records that contain all items in S.
Intuitively, an attacker, who knows any set S of up to m diagnosis codes about
a patient, will have to consider at least k candidate records in a possible original
dataset. We provide a concrete example to illustrate this in the next subsection.
3.2. Overview of the disassociation transformation strategy
In this section, we present disassociation, a data transformation strategy that
partitions the records in the original dataset D into subrecords, following the basic
principles of the strategy presented in [55]. The goal of our strategy is to “hide”
combinations of diagnosis codes that appear few times in D, by scattering them
in the subrecords of the published dataset. The particular merit of disassociation
is that it preserves all original diagnosis codes in the published dataset, in contrast
to generalization and suppression. This is important to preserve data utility in
various medical analysis tasks that cannot be predetermined, as explained in the
introduction and will be verified experimentally.
To illustrate the main idea of disassociation, we use Fig. 4, which shows a
disassociated dataset produced from the original dataset D of Fig. 1. Observe
that the dataset in Fig. 4 is divided into two clusters, P1 and P2, which contain
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the records r1−r5 and r6−r10, respectively. Furthermore, the diagnosis codes
in a cluster are divided into subsets, and each record in the cluster is split into
subrecords according to these subsets. For example, the diagnosis codes in P1 are
divided into subsets T1 ={296.00, 296.01, 296.02}, T2 ={692.71, 695.10}, and
TT ={834.0, 401.0, 944.01}, according to which r1 is split into three subrecords;
{296.00, 296.01, 296.02}, an empty subrecord {}, and {834.0, 944.01}. The col-
lection of all (possibly empty) subrecords of different records that correspond to
the same subset of diagnosis codes is called a chunk. For instance, the subrecord
{296.00, 296.01, 296.02} of r1 goes into chunkC1, the empty subrecord goes into
chunk C2, and the subrecord {834.0, 944.01} goes into chunk CT . In contrast to
C1 and C2 which are record chunks, CT is a special, item chunk, containing a
single set of diagnosis codes. In our example, CT contains the set {834.0, 401.0,
944.01}, which represents the subrecords from all r1−r5 containing these codes.
Thus, the number of times each diagnosis code in CT appears in the original data-
set is completely hidden from the attacker, who can only assume that this number
ranges from 1 to |Pi|, where |Pi| is the number of records in Pi.
In addition, the order of the subrecords that fall into a chunk is randomized,
which implies that the association between subrecords in different chunks is hid-
den from the attacker. In fact, the original dataset D may contain any record that
could be reconstructed by a combination of subrecords from the different chunks
plus any subset of diagnosis codes fromCT . For example, {296.00, 296.01, 834.0,
944.01} in Fig. 5 is a reconstructed record, which is created by taking {296.00,
296.01} from C1, the empty subrecord {} from C2, and {834.0, 944.01} from
CT . Observe that this record does not appear in the original dataset of Fig. 1.
The disassociated dataset DA amounts to the set of all possible original datasets
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I(DA) (see Guarantee 1). In other words, the original dataset D is hidden, among
all possible datasets that can be reconstructed from DA. A dataset, which is re-
constructed from the disassociated dataset in Fig. 4, is shown in Fig. 5. Note that
reconstructed datasets can be greatly useful to data analysts, because (i) they have
similar statistical properties to the original dataset from which they are produced,
and (ii) they can be analyzed directly, using off-the-shelf tools (e.g., SPSS), in
contrast to generalized datasets that require special handling (e.g., interpreting a
generalized code as an original diagnosis code, with a certain probability).
As an example, consider the dataset in Fig. 4, which satisfies Guarantee 1, for
k = 3 and m = 2. Observe that an attacker, who knows up to m = 2 codes from
a record r of the original dataset in Fig. 1, must consider a reconstructed dataset
that has at least 3 records containing the codes known to them. We emphasize
that each of these codes can appear in any chunk of a cluster in DA, including
the item chunk. For instance, an attacker, who knows that the record of a patient
contains 296.01 and 834.0, must consider the dataset in Fig. 5. In this dataset, the
combination of these codes appears in the records r1, r2, and r3.
ID Records
r1 {296.00, 296.01, 834.0, 944.01}
r2 {296.02, 296.01, 692.71, 834.0}
r3 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10, 834.0}
r4 {296.00, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10}
r5 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10, 401.0}
r6 {296.02, 295.04, 480.1}
r7 {294.10, 296.02, 404.00, 834.0, 944.01}
r8 {294.10, 295.04, 296.02, 480.1, 834.0}
r9 {294.10, 295.04, 404.00, 834.0}
r10 {294.10, 295.04, 296.02, 834.0, 944.01}
Figure 5: A possible dataset D′ reconstructed from DA of Figure 4.
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3.3. Measuring Data Utility
Different datasets that can be produced by an original dataset, using disas-
sociation, do not offer the same utility. In addition, most existing measures for
anonymized data using generalization and/or suppression, such as those proposed
in [56, 61, 36, 35], are not applicable to disassociated datasets. Therefore, we me-
asure data utility using the accuracy of: (i) answering COUNT queries on disasso-
ciated data, and (ii) estimating the number of records that are associated with any
set of diagnosis codes in a utility constraint (i.e., matched to the constraint). The
first way to measure data utility considers a scenario in which data recipients issue
queries to perform case counting (i.e., discover the number of patients diagnosed
with a set of one or more diagnosis codes, using COUNT queries). Alike other
transformation strategies, disassociation may degrade the accuracy of answering
COUNT queries [36, 55]. Thus, a utility measure must capture how accurately
such queries can be answered using disassociated data. The second way to quan-
tify data utility considers a scenario in which various analytic tasks, simulated
through different utility policies, are performed by data recipients. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no measures that can capture data utility in this scenario.
To quantify the accuracy of answering a workload of COUNT queries on
disassociated data, we use the Average Relative Error (ARE) measure and queries
of the following SQL-like form:
SELECT COUNT r′ (or r)
FROM D′ (or D)
WHERE P is supported by r′ in D′ (or P supports r in D)
where P ′ and P are sets of diagnosis codes, in the anonymized dataset D′ and
in the original dataset D, respectively. These sets retrieve sets of a fixed num-
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ber of diagnosis codes. These queries are used by several prior works on data
anonymization (e.g., [32, 58, 39, 36, 35, 55]), and they are important, because
they form the basis for more complex queries and various analytic tasks (e.g., fre-
quent itemset mining and classification). ARE is a standard data utility indicator
[36, 35, 55], which reflects the average number of transactions that are retrieved
incorrectly as part of query answers. The following definition explains how ARE
can be computed.
Definition 2. Let W be a workload of COUNT queries q1, ..., qn, and CA and CO
be functions which count the number of records answering a query qi, i ∈ [1, n]
on the anonymized dataset D′ and on the original dataset D, respectively. The
ARE measure for W is computed as
ARE(W) = avg∀i∈[1,n]
|CA(qi)− CO(qi)|
CO(qi)
Thus, ARE is computed as the mean error of answering all queries in the query
workload W . Clearly, a zero ARE implies that the anonymized dataset D′ are as
useful as the original dataset in answering the queries in W , and low scores in
ARE are preferred.
To capture data utility in the presence of specified utility policies, we propose
a new measure, called Matching Relative Error (MRE). The computation of MRE
is illustrated in the following definition.
Definition 3. Let u be a utility constraint in U , and MA and MO be functions,
which return the number of records that match u in the anonymized dataset D′
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and in the original dataset D, respectively. The MRE for u is computed as
MRE(u) =
MO(u)−MA(u)
MO(u)
Thus, a zero MRE implies that an anonymized dataset can support u as well as
the original dataset does, and MRE scores close to zero are preferred. For clarity,
we report MRE as a percentage (i.e., the percent error). For example, an MRE
in the interval [−5%, 5%] implies that the number of transactions that match the
utility constraint in the anonymized dataset is no more than 5% different (larger
or smaller) than the corresponding number in the original dataset.
4. Disassociation algorithm
This section presents our disassociation-based algorithm for anonymizing di-
agnosis codes, which is referred to as DISASSOCIATION. This algorithm performs
three operations: (i) horizontal partitioning, (ii) vertical partitioning, and (iii) re-
fining. Horizontal partitioning brings together similar records with respect to di-
agnosis codes into clusters. As will be explained, performing this operation is
important to preserve privacy with low utility loss. Subsequently, the algorithm
performs vertical partitioning. This operation, which is the heart of our method,
disassociates combinations of diagnosis codes that require protection and crea-
tes chunks. DISASSOCIATION differs from the method of [55] in that it aims at
producing data that satisfy utility constraints and hence remain useful in medical
analysis. Specifically, the horizontal and vertical partitioning phases in our al-
gorithm treat codes that are contained in utility constraints as first-class citizens,
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so that they are preserved in the published dataset to the largest possible extent.
Last, our algorithm performs the refining operation, to further reduce information
loss and improve the utility of the disassociated data, A high-level pseudocode of
DISASSOCIATION is given in Fig. 6. In addition, Fig. 7 summarizes the notation
used in our algorithm and in the algorithms that perform its operations.
Algorithm: DISASSOCIATION
Input : Original dataset D,
parameters k and m
Output : Disassociated dataset DA
1 Split D into disjoint clusters by applying Algorithm HORPART;
2 for every cluster P produced do
3 Split P vertically into chunks by applying Algorithm VERPART;
4 Refine clusters;
5 return DA;
Figure 6: DISASSOCIATION algorithm.
Symbol Explanation
D, DA Original, anonymized dataset
T The set of all diagnosis codes in D
U Set of utility constraints
TU The set of all diagnosis codes in U
s(a) Support of diagnosis code a
P , P1 . . . Clusters
TP Domain of cluster
C, C1, . . . Record chunks
T1, T2, . . . Domain of record chunk
CT Item chunk
TT Domain of item chunk
Figure 7: Notation used in our DISASSOCIATION algorithm and in the algorithms HORPART and
VERPART.
In the following, we present the details of the horizontal partitioning, vertical
partitioning, and refining operations of our algorithm.
Horizontal partitioning. This operation groups records of the original dataset D
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into disjoint clusters, according to the similarity of diagnosis codes. For instance,
cluster P1 is formed by records r1−r5, which have many codes in common, as
can be seen in Fig. 4. The creation of clusters is performed with a light-weight,
but very effective heuristic, called HORPART. The pseudocode of HORPART is
provided in Fig. 8. This heuristic aims at creating coherent clusters, whose records
will require the least possible disassociation, during vertical partitioning.
To achieve this, the key idea is to split the dataset into two parts, D1 and D2,
according to: (i) the support of diagnosis codes in D (the support of a diagnosis
code a, denoted with s(a), is the number of records in D in which a appears), and
(ii) the participation of diagnosis codes in the utility policy U . At each step, D1
contains all records with the diagnosis code a, whereas D2 contains the remaining
records. This procedure is applied recursively, to each of the constructed parts,
until they are small enough to become clusters. Diagnosis codes that have been
previously used for partitioning are recorded in a set ignore and are not used again.
In each recursive call, Algorithm HORPART selects a diagnosis code a, in lines
3-10. In the first call, a is selected as the most frequent code (i.e., the code with
the largest support), which is contained in a utility constraint. At each subsequent
call, a is selected as the most frequent code, among the codes contained in u (i.e.,
the utility constraint with the code chosen in the previous call) (line 4). When all
diagnosis codes in u have been considered, a is selected as the most frequent code
in the set {T−ignore}, which is also contained in a utility constraint (line 6). Of
course, if no diagnosis code is contained in a utility constraint, we simply select a
as the most frequent diagnosis code (line 9).
Horizontal partitioning reduces the task of anonymizing the original dataset to
the anonymization of small and independent clusters. We opted for this simple
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Algorithm: HORPART
Input : Dataset D,
set of diagnosis codes ignore (initially empty),
a utility constraint u ∈ U (initially empty)
Output : A HORizontal PARTitioning of D, i.e., a set of clusters
Param. : The maximum cluster size maxClusterSize
1 Let T be the set of diagnosis codes in D, and TU be the set of diagnosis codes
appearing in the utility constraints of U ;
2 if |D| < maxClusterSize then return {D} ;
3 if {T − ignore}
⋂
u 6= {} then
4 Find the most frequent diagnosis code a in {T − ignore}
⋂
u;
5 else if {T − ignore}
⋂
TU 6= {} then
6 Find the most frequent diagnosis code a in {T − ignore}
⋂
TU ;
7 u← the constraint a belongs to;
8 else
9 Find the most frequent diagnosis code a in {T − ignore};
10 u← {};
11 D1 ← the set of all records of D that have a;
12 D2 ← D −D1;
13 return HORPART(D1, ignore ∪ a, u)∪HORPART(D2, ignore , {})
Figure 8: HORPART algorithm.
heuristic, because it achieves a good trade-off between data utility and efficiency,
as shown in our experiments. However, we note that any other algorithm for
creating groups of at least k records could be used instead.
Vertical partitioning. This operation partitions the clusters into chunks, using a
greedy heuristic that is applied to each cluster independently. The intuition behind
the operation of this heuristic, called VERPART, is twofold. First, the algorithm
tries to distribute infrequent combinations of codes into different chunks to pre-
serve privacy, as in [55]. Second, it aims at satisfying the utility constraints, in
which the diagnosis codes in the cluster are contained. To achieve this, the algo-
rithm attempts to create record chunks, which contain as many diagnosis codes
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from the same utility constraint as possible. Clearly, creating a record chunk that
contains all the diagnosis codes of one or more utility constraints is beneficial, as
tasks involving these codes (e.g., clinical case count studies) can be performed as
accurately as in the original dataset.
The pseudocode of VERPART is provided in Fig. 9. This algorithm takes as
input a cluster P , along with the parameters k and m, and returns a set of km-
anonymous record chunks C1, . . . , Cv, and the item chunk CT of P . Given the
set of diagnosis codes T P in P , VERPART computes the support s(t) of every
code t in P and moves all diagnosis codes having lower support than k from T P
to a set TT (lines 2-4). As the remaining codes have support at least k, they will
participate in some record chunk. Next, it orders T P according to: (i) s(t), and
(ii) the participation of the codes in utility constraints (line 5). Specifically, the
diagnosis codes in P that belong to the same constraint u in U form groups, which
are ordered two times; first in decreasing s(t), and then in decreasing s(t) of their
first (most frequent) diagnosis code.
Subsequently, VERPART computes the sets T1, . . . , Tv (lines 6-20). To this
end, the set Tremain , which contains the ordered, non-assigned codes, and the set
Tcur , which contains the codes that will be assigned to the current set, are used.
To compute Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ v), VERPART considers all diagnosis codes in Tremain
and inserts a code t into Tcur , only if the Ctest chunk, constructed from Tcur ∪{t},
remains km-anonymous (line 13). Note that the first execution of the for loop in
line 10, will always add t into Tcur, since Ctest = {t} is km-anonymous. If the
insertion of t to Tcur does not render Tcur ∪ {t} km-anonymous, t is skipped and
the algorithm considers the next code. While assigning codes from Tremain to Tcur ,
VERPART also tracks the utility constraint that each code is contained in (line 14).
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Algorithm: VERPART
Input : A cluster P , parameters k and m
Output : A km-anonymous VERtical PARTitioning of P
1 Let TP be the set of diagnosis codes of P , i.e., the domain of P ;
2 for every diagnosis code t ∈ TP do
//s(t) is the number of records of P the code t
appears in
3 Compute the support s(t);
4 Move all diagnosis codes with s(t) < k from TP into TT ; //TT is finalized
5 Identify the groups of diagnosis codes in TP that belong to the same utility
constraint of U , sort the diagnosis codes of each group in decreasing s(t), and
then sort the groups in decreasing support of their first diagnosis code;
6 i← 0;
7 Tremain ← T
P ;
8 while Tremain 6= {} do
9 Tcur ← {};
10 for every diagnosis code t ∈ Tremain do
11 Create a chunk Ctest by projecting the records of P to Tcur ∪ {t} ;
12 if Ctest is km-anonymous then
13 Tcur ← Tcur ∪ {t};
14 keep track of the constraint in which t is contained (if any);
15 for every diagnosis code t ∈ Tcur do
16 if t belongs to a constraint u, which is different from the constraint of the
first diagnosis code added to Tcur and not all diagnosis codes of u are
added to Tcur then
17 Tcur ← Tcur − {t};
18 i← i+ 1 ;
19 Ti ← Tcur ;
20 Tremain ← Tremain − Tcur ;
21 Create record chunks C1, . . . , Cv by projecting to T1, . . . , Tv;
22 Create item chunk CT using TT ;
23 return {C1, . . . , Cv, CT }
Figure 9: VERPART algorithm.
Next, VERPART iterates over each code t in Tcur and removes it from Tcur , if two
conditions are met: (i) t is contained in a utility constraint u that is different from
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the constraint of the first code assigned to Tcur , and (ii) all codes in u have also
been assigned to Tcur (lines 16-17). Removing t enables the algorithm to insert
the code into another record chunk (along with the remaining codes of u) in a
subsequent step. After that, VERPART assigns Tcur to Ti, removes the diagnosis
codes of Tcur from Tremain , and continues to the next set Ti+1 (lines 18-20).
Last, the algorithm constructs and returns the set {C1, . . . , Cv, CT} (lines 21-
23). This set consists of the record chunks C1, . . . , Cv, and the item chunk CT ,
which are created in lines 21 and 22, respectively.
In the following, we clarify the intuition behind lines 15-17. When VERPART
starts creating a chunk in lines 10-14, it uses codes that may belong to different
constraints. This aims at reducing the total number of record chunks in each
cluster, by assigning as many codes as possible to a chunk (even from different
constraints). Recall that the more record chunks we have in each cluster, the more
disassociated the resulting dataset will be, and this is something we should avoid.
Thus, when codes from more than one utility constraint can be added into
the same chunk, then there is no need to split them and create one chunk per
constraint. Consider, for example, that VERPART created a chunk in lines 10-14,
and that the codes in the chunk appear in two different utility constraints u1 and
u2. Without loss of generality, we assume that the codes of u1 are inserted into
the chunk before those of u2. The fact that all codes of the same constraint will
be checked before the codes of a different constraint is ensured, by the sorting in
line 5 of VERPART. Since codes of u1 are inserted into the cluster first, we know
that, if a code of u1 was not inserted at that point, then this is because it breaks the
km-anonymity guarantee, due to a combination with codes of the same constraint,
i.e., u1. Hence, there is nothing better to be done, for the set of codes of u1, in
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this case. However, for the remaining codes of u2, the situation requires a different
treatment. If there is a code of u2 that was not included in the chunk, then this may
have happened because the km-anonymity was violated by a combination of this
code and a code of u1. Still, it may be possible that all codes of u2 can be included
in another chunk of the cluster, without violating the privacy guarantee. For this
reason, the algorithm removes all codes of u2 that were inserted in the chunk
of the current step (lines 15-17) and tries to include all of them together (along
with the previously excluded code) into a subsequent chunk of the cluster. In any
case, the maximum set of codes from u2 that does not violate the km-anonymity
is guaranteed to be added into a chunk, when the algorithm considers this set first
in the creation of a chunk, as in the case of codes from u1 we described before.
Refining. This operation focuses on further improving the utility of the disas-
sociated dataset, while maintaining Guarantee 1. To this end, we examine the
diagnosis codes that reside in the item chunk of each cluster. Consider, for exam-
ple, Fig. 4. The item chunk of the cluster P1 contains the diagnosis codes 834.0
and 944.01, because the support of these codes in P1 is 2 (i.e., lower than k = 3).
For similar reasons, these diagnosis codes are also contained in the item chunk of
P2. However, the support of these codes in both clusters P1 and P2 together is not
small enough to violate privacy (i.e., the combination of 834.0 and 944.01 appears
as many times as the one of 296.03 and 294.10 which is in the record chunk of
P2).
To handle such situations, we introduce the notion of joint clusters by allowing
different clusters to have common record chunks. Given a set T s of refining codes
(e.g., 834.0 and 944.01 in the aforementioned example), which commonly appear
in the item chunks of two or more clusters (e.g., P1 and P2), we can define a joint
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cluster by (i) constructing one or more shared chunks after projecting the original
records of the initial clusters to T s and (ii) removing all diagnosis codes in T s
from the item chunks of the initial clusters. Fig. 10 shows a joint cluster, created
by combining the clusters P1 and P2 of Fig. 4, when T s={834.0, 944.01}.
Furthermore, large joint clusters can be built by combining smaller joint clus-
ters. Note that the creation of shared chunks is performed similarly to the method
of [55], but shared chunks are created by our VERPART algorithm, which also
takes into account the utility constraints.
Record Item Shared
P1 cluster
{834.0,944.01}
{944.01}
{834.0}
{834.0,944.01}
{834.0,944.01}
{296.00, 296.01, 296.02}
{296.00, 296.01, 296.02} {692.71, 695.10} 401.0
{296.00, 296.02} {692.71, 695.10}
{296.00, 296.01} {692.71}
{296.00, 296.01, 296.02} {692.71, 695.10}
P2 cluster
{296.03, 295.04}
{294.10, 296.03} 404.00,
{294.10, 295.04, 296.03} 480.1
{294.10, 295.04}
{294.10, 295.04, 296.03}
Figure 10: Disassociation with a shared chunk.
We now provide an analysis of the time complexity of our algorithm.
Time Complexity. We first consider each operation of DISASSOCIATION sepa-
rately. The worst-case time complexity of the horizontal partitioning operation is
O(|D|2). This is because HORPART works similarly to the Quicksort algorithm,
but instead of a pivot, it splits each partition by selecting the code a. Thus, in
the worst case, HORPART performs |D| splits and at each of them it re-orders |D|
records. The time complexity of vertical partitioning depends on the domain T P
of the input cluster P , and not on the characteristics of the complete dataset. The
most expensive operation of VERPART is to ensure that a chunk is km-anonymous,
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which requires examining
(
|TP |
m
)
combinations of diagnosis codes. Thus, VER-
PART takes O(|T P |!) time, where T P is small in practice, as we regulate the size
of the clusters. Last, the complexity of the refining operation is O(|D|2). This
is because, in the worst case, the number of passes over the clusters equals the
number of the clusters in D. Thus, the behavior of DISASSOCIATION is domina-
ted by that of HORPART, as the dataset size grows. Note that this analysis refers
to a worst-case. In practice, our algorithm is as efficient as the method in [55],
although it takes into account utility constraints.
5. Example of disassociation
This section presents a concrete example of applying DISASSOCIATION to the
dataset D of Fig. 1. The input parameters are k = 3 and m = 2, and that the
maxClusterSize parameter of HORPART is set to 6 4.
Horizontal partitioning. First, DISASSOCIATION performs the horizontal parti-
tioning operation on the original dataset D, using the HORPART algorithm. The
algorithm selects 296.00, which participates in constraint u1 of Fig. 3b and has
the largest support. It then splits D into two parts, D1 and D2. D1 consists of
the records containing 296.00 (i.e., r1-r5), whereas D2 contains the remaining re-
cords r6-r10. At this point, 296.00 is moved from the domain T of D1 into the set
ignore, so that it will not be used in subsequent splits of D1. Moreover, the next
call of HORPART for D1 (line 13) is performed with the utility constraint u1 as
input. Thus, HORPART tries to further partition D1, using the codes of this con-
straint. On the contrary, an empty ignore set and no utility constraint are given
4This parameter could be set to any value at least equal to the value of k. However, it is fixed
to 2·k, because we have observed that this leads to producing good clusters.
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as input to HORPART, when it is applied to D2. As the size of both D1 and D2 is
lower than maxClusterSize (condition in line 2 of 8), HORPART produces the
dataset in Fig. 11. This dataset is comprised of the clusters P1 and P2, which
amount to D1 and D2, respectively.
ID Records
r1 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 834.0, 944.01}
r2 {296.00, 296.02, 296.01, 401.0, 944.01, 692.71, 695.10}
r3 {296.00, 296.02, 692.71, 834.0, 695.10}
r4 {296.00, 296.01, 692.71, 401.0}
r5 {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10}
ID Records
r6 {296.03, 295.04, 404.00, 480.1}
r7 {294.10, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01}
r8 {294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 480.1}
r9 {294.10, 295.04, 404.00}
r10 {294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01}
Figure 11: Output of horizontal partitioning on D.
Vertical partitioning. Then, DISASSOCIATION performs vertical partitioning
operation, by applying VERPART to each of the clusters P1 and P2. The latter
algorithm computes the support of each code in P1, and then moves 401.0, 834.0
and 944.01, from the cluster domain TP into the set TT (line 4 in VERPART).
The codes are moved to TT , which corresponds to the domain of the item chunk,
because they have a lower support than k = 3. Thus, TP now contains {296.00,
296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10}, and it is sorted according to the support of these
codes in P1 and their participation in a utility constraint of U . Specifically, for the
utility constraints of Fig. 3b, we distinguish two groups of codes in TP ; a group
{296.00, 296.01, 296.02}, which contains the codes in u1, and another group
{692.71, 695.10} with the codes in u2. Next, VERPART sorts the first group in
descending order of the support of its codes. Thus, 296.00 is placed first and fol-
lowed by 296.01 and 296.02. The second group is sorted similarly. After that, the
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two groups are sorted in descending order of the support of their first code. Thus,
the final ordering of TP is {296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10}.
Subsequently, VERPART constructs the record chunks of P1 (lines 10-14), as
follows. First, it selects 296.00 and checks whether the set of projections of the
records r1-r5 on this code is 32-anonymous. This holds, as 296.00 appears in all
records of P1. Thus, VERPART places 296.00 into the set Tcur, which will later
be used to define the record chunk C1. Then, the algorithm selects 296.01 and
checks whether the projections of all records r1-r5 on {296.00, 296.01} are also
32-anonymous. As this is true, 296.01 is moved to Tcur, and the same procedure is
performed, for each of the codes 296.02, 692.71, and 695.10. When the projecti-
ons of the records r1-r5 are found to be 32-anonymous, the corresponding code is
added to Tcur. Otherwise, it is left in a set Tremain to be used in a subsequent step.
Notice that 296.02 and 692.71 are added into Tcur, but the code 695.10 is not.
This is because the combination of codes 296.01 and 695.10 appears in only two
records of P1 (i.e., r2 and r5), hence, the projections of records r1-r5 on {296.00,
296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10} are not 32-anonymous.
After considering all codes in TP , VERPART checks whether the codes of a
constraint u ∈ U are only partially added to Tcur. This is true for 692.71, which
is separated from 695.10 of the same constraint u2. Hence, 692.71 is moved from
Tcur back to Tremain (line 17), so that it can be added to the chunk C2 of P1 along
with 695.10. After that, the algorithm finalizes the chunk C1, according to Tcur,
empties the latter set, and proceeds to creating C2. By following this procedure
for the cluster P2, VERPART constructs the dataset DA in Fig. 4.
Refining. During this operation, DISASSOCIATION constructs the shared chunks,
which are shown in Figure 10, as follows. It inspects the item chunks of P1 and
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P2 in Fig. 4, and it identifies that each of the codes 834.0 and 944.01 appears in
two records of P1, as well as in two records of P2. Note that the actual supports of
codes in item chunks are available to the algorithm after the vertical partitioning
operation, although they are not evident from Fig. 4 (because they are completely
hidden in the published dataset). Since the total support of 834.0 and 944.01 in
both clusters is 2 + 2 = 4 > k = 3, the algorithm reconstructs the projections
of r1-r5 and r6-r10 on the item chunk domain of P1 and P2 respectively, and calls
VERPART, which creates the shared chunk of Fig. 10.
6. Experimental evaluation
6.1. Experimental data and setup
We implemented all algorithms in C++ and applied them to the INFORMS
dataset [8], whose characteristics are shown in Table 1. This dataset was used in
INFORMS 2008 Data Mining contest, whose objective was to develop predictive
methods for identifying high-risk patients, admitted for elective surgery. In our
experiments, we retained the diagnosis code part of patient records only.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our DISASSOCIATION algorithm, referred
to as Dis, by comparing to CBA, which employs generalization to prevent identity
disclosure based on diagnosis codes. The default parameters were k=5 and m=2,
and the hierarchies used in CBA were created as in [35]. All experiments ran on
an Intel Xeon at 2.4 GHz with 12 GB of RAM.
Dataset |D| Distinct codes Max, Avg # codes/record
INFORMS 58302 631 43, 5.11
Table 1: Description of the dataset.
To evaluate data utility, we employed the ARE and MRE measures, discussed
in Section 3.3. For the computation of ARE, we used two different types of query
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workloads. The first workload type, referred to as W1, contains queries asking
for sets of diagnosis codes that a certain percentage of all patients have. In other
words, these queries retrieve frequent itemsets (i.e., sets of diagnosis codes that
appear in at least a specified percentage of records (transactions), expressed using
a minimum support threshold). Answering such queries accurately is crucial in
various biomedical data analysis applications [35], since frequent itemsets serve
as building blocks in several data mining models [32]. The second workload type
we considered is referred to as W2 and contains 1000 queries, which retrieve sets
of diagnosis codes, selected uniformly at random. These queries are important,
because it may be difficult for data owners to predict many of the analytic tasks
that will be applied to anonymized data by data recipients.
In addition, we evaluated MRE using three classes of utility policies: hierarchy-
based, similarity-based, and frequency-based. The first two types of policies have
been introduced in [35] and model semantic relationships between diagnosis co-
des. For hierarchy-based policies, these relationships are formed using the ICD
hierarchy. Specifically, hierarchy-based utility policies are constructed by forming
a different utility constraint for all 5-digit ICD codes that have a common ancestor
(other than the root) in the ICD hierarchy. The common ancestor of these codes is
a 3-digit ICD code, Section, or Chapter5, for the case of level 1, level 2, and level
3 hierarchy-based policies, respectively. For example, consider a utility constraint
u for Schizophrenic disorders. The 5-digit ICD codes in u are of the form 295.xy,
where x = {0, ..., 9} and y = {0, ..., 5}, and they have the 3-digit ICD code 295
as their common ancestor. The utility constraint u is shown in the first row of
5Sections and Chapters are internal nodes in the ICD hierarchy, which model aggregate con-
cepts http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd9/icdguide10.pdf.
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Table 2. By forming a different utility constraint, for each 3-digit ICD code in
the hierarchy (e.g., 296, 297, etc.), we construct a level 1, hierarchy-based policy.
Alternatively, the common ancestor of the codes in the utility constraint u may be
a Section. For example, u is comprised of Psychoses, whose common ancestor is
295-299, in the second row of Table 2. In this case, u will be contained in a level
2, hierarchy-based policy. In another case, the common ancestor for the codes in
u may be a Chapter. For example, u may correspond to Mental disorders that
have 290-319 as their common ancestor (see the last row of Table 2). In this case,
u is contained in a level 3, hierarchy-based policy.
Type codes in utility constraint
level 1 {295.00, 295.01, . . . , 295.95}
level 2 {295.00, 295.01, . . . , 295.95, 296.00, . . . , 299.91}
level 3 {290.10, 295.00, 295.01, . . . , 295.95, 296.00, . . . , 299.91, . . . , 299.91, . . . , 319}
Table 2: Examples of hierarchy-based utility constraints
The similarity-based utility policies are comprised from utility constraints that
contain the same number of sibling 5-digit ICD codes in the hierarchy. Specifi-
cally, we considered similarity-based constraints containing 5, 10, 25, and 100
codes and refer to their associated utility policies as sim 5, 10, 25, and 100, re-
spectively. Consider, for instance, a utility constraint that contains 5 sibling ICD
codes; 295.00, 295.01, 295.02, 295.03, and 295.04. This constraint, as well as all
other constraints that contain 5 sibling ICD codes (e.g., a utility constraint that
contains 296.00, . . . , 296.04), will be contained in a sim 5 utility policy. Last,
we considered frequency-based utility policies that model frequent itemsets. We
mined frequent itemsets using the FP-Growth algorithm [27], which was configu-
red with a varying minimum support threshold in {0.625, 1.25, 2.5, 5}. Thus, the
generated utility constraints contain sets of diagnosis codes that appear in at least
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0.625%, 1.25%, 2.5%, and 5% percent of records, respectively. The utility poli-
cies associated with such constraints are denoted with sup 0.625, 1.25, 2.5, and 5,
respectively. Unless otherwise stated, we use level 1, sim 10, and sup 0.625, as
the default hierarchy, similarity, and frequency based utility policy, respectively.
6.2. Feasibility of identity disclosure
The risk of performing identity disclosure was quantified by measuring the
number of records that share a set of m diagnosis codes. This number equals
the inverse of the probability of performing identity disclosure, using these codes.
Fig. 12 shows that more than 17% of all sets of 2 diagnosis codes appear in one
record. Consequently, more than 17% of patients are uniquely re-identifiable, if
the dataset is released intact. Furthermore, fewer than 5% of records contain a
diagnosis code that appears at least 5 times. Thus, approximately 95% of records
are unsafe, based on the probability threshold of 0.2 that is used typically [19].
Moreover, the number of times a set of diagnosis codes appears in the dataset
increases with m. For example, 96% of sets containing 5 diagnosis codes appear
only once. As we will see shortly, our algorithm can thwart attackers with such
knowledge, by enforcing km-anonymity withm = 5, while preserving data utility.
6.3. Comparison with CBA
In this set of experiments, we demonstrate that our method can enforce km-
anonymity, while allowing more accurate query answering than CBA. We also
examine the impact of dataset size on the effectiveness and efficiency of both
methods.
We first report ARE for query workloads of type W1 and for the following
utility policies: level 1 (hierarchy-based), sim 10 (similarity-based), and sup 1.25
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Figure 12: Number of records in which a percentage of combinations, containing 2 to 5 diagnosis
codes, appears.
(frequency-based). For a fair comparison, the diagnosis codes retrieved by all que-
ries are among those that are not suppressed by CBA. Fig. 13a illustrates the re-
sults for the level 1 policy. On average, the ARE scores for Dis and CBA are 0.055
and 0.155, respectively. This shows that the use of disassociation instead of ge-
neralization allows enforcing km-anonymity with low information loss. Figs. 13b
and 13c show the corresponding results for the similarity-based and frequency-
based policies, respectively. Again, our method outperformed CBA, achieving
ARE scores that are substantially lower (better). Of note, the difference between
the ARE scores for Dis and CBA, in each of the experiments in Figs. 13a to 13c,
was found to be statistically significant, according to Welch’s t-test (p < 0.01).
It is also worth noting that the difference of Dis and CBA with respect to ARE,
increases as the utility policies get less stringent. For instance, the ARE scores for
Dis and CBA are 0.129 and 0.163, respectively, for level 1, hierarchy-based po-
licies, but 0.006 and 0.1, respectively, for level 3, hierarchy-based policies. This
suggests that both algorithms perform reasonably well with respect to query ans-
wering, for restrictive constraints. However, CBA does so by suppressing a large
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number of diagnosis codes, as will be discussed later. Thus, the result of CBA is
generally of lower utility (e.g., it does not allow queries on suppressed codes to
be answered). Quantitatively similar results were obtained for query workloads of
type W2 (omitted, for brevity).
(a) level 1 (b) sim 10 (c) sup 1.25
Figure 13: Comparison with CBA with respect to ARE for query workloads of type W1 and for
different utility policies.
Figure 14: Percentage of distinct diagnosis codes that are suppressed by CBA (no diagnosis codes
are suppressed by our method, by design).
Next, we report the number of distinct diagnosis codes that are suppressed
when k is set to 5, m is 2 or 3, and the utility policies of the previous experiment
are used. The results in Fig. 14 show that CBA suppressed a relatively large num-
ber of diagnosis codes, particularly when strong privacy is required and the utility
constraints are stringent. For instance, 23.6% (i.e., 149 out of 631) of distinct
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diagnoses codes were suppressed, when m = 3 and the level 1 utility policy was
used. On the contrary, our method released all diagnoses codes intact, as it does
not employ suppression. This is particularly useful for medical studies (e.g., in
epidemiology), where a large number of codes are of interest.
Then, we examined the effect of dataset size on ARE, by applying Dis and
CBA on increasingly larger subsets of the dataset. The smallest and largest of
these subsets contain the first 2.5K and 25K records of the dataset, respectively.
In addition, we used query workloads of type W2 and the sup 1.25 utility policy.
The results in Fig. 15a show that both algorithms incurred more information loss
to anonymize smaller datasets. This is expected, because all datasets contain at
least 79% of the diagnosis codes of the entire dataset, and many sets of diagnosis
codes have a lower support than k. The ARE scores for Dis were always low,
and substantially lower than those for CBA, for smaller datasets. For example,
for the smallest dataset, the ARE scores for Dis and CBA were 0.95 and 11.57.
The difference between the ARE scores for Dis and CBA, in all the results in
Fig. 15a, was found to be statistically significant, according to Welch’s t-test
(p < 0.01). Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 15b, CBA suppressed a relatively large
percentage of diagnosis codes, which decreased as the dataset size grows, for the
reason explained before.
Last, we compared the runtime of Dis to that of CBA. We used the same pa-
rameters as in Fig. 15a and report the results in Fig. 15c. As can be seen, both
algorithms required less than 5 seconds. However, Dis is more efficient than CBA,
and the performance gain increases with the dataset size. Specifically, Dis nee-
ded 1.2 seconds to anonymize the largest dataset, while Dis needed 4.9 seconds.
In addition, the computation cost of Dis remained sub-quadratic, for all tested
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datasets.
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Figure 15: Impact of dataset size on (a) ARE, (b) percentage of distinct codes that are suppressed
by CBA, and (c) efficiency.
Having established that our method outperforms CBA, we do not include re-
sults for CBA in the remainder of the section.
6.4. Supporting clinical case count studies
In the following, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method at producing
data that support clinical case count studies.
Fig. 16a illustrates the results for all three hierarchy-based policies and for
query workloads of type W2. These workloads require retrieving a randomly se-
lected set of 1 to 4 diagnosis codes. For consistency, we add a random code to
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a set of c diagnosis codes to produce a larger set of c + 1 codes. For instance,
a random code is added to a set of 1 diagnosis code to obtain a set containing 2
diagnosis codes. Observe that the error in query answering is fairly small and in-
creases with the size of sets of diagnosis codes. This is because larger sets appear
in few records and are more difficult to be made km-anonymous.Furthermore, low
ARE scores are achieved, even for the level 1 utility policy, which is difficult to
satisfy using generalization. Similar observations can be made for other types of
constraints, as can be seen in Figs. 16b and 16c.
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Figure 16: ARE for query workloads of type W2 that retrieve 1 to 4 diagnosis codes and for
different utility policies.
Fig. 17a shows the results, for hierarchy-based constraints and query worklo-
ads of type W1. The corresponding results for similarity-based and frequency-
based constraints are reported in Figs. 17b and 17c, respectively. Note that ARE
scores are very low. In addition, queries involving more frequent sets of diagnosis
codes can be answered highly accurately.
Next, we examined the impact of k on ARE, by varying this parameter in
[5, 25], and considering the level 1, sim 10, and sup 2.5 utility policies. As can be
seen in Fig. 18, ARE increases with k, as it is more difficult to retain associations
between diagnosis codes, when clusters are large. However, the ARE scores are
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Figure 17: ARE for query workloads of type W1 and for different utility policies.
low, which indicates that our method permits accurate query answering.
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Figure 18: ARE for varying k in [5, 25] and for different utility policies.
6.5. Effectiveness in medical analytic tasks
In this set of experiments, we evaluate our method in terms of its effectiveness
at supporting different utility policies. Given a utility policy, we measure MRE,
for all constraints in the policy, and report the percentage of constraints, whose
MRE falls into a certain interval. Recall from Section 6.1 that intervals whose
endpoints are close to zero are preferred.
Fig. 19 reports the results, for the level 1 utility policy. The MRE of all
constraints in this policy is in [−24%, 5%), while the MRE of the vast majority
of constraints falls into much narrower intervals. Furthermore, the percentage of
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constraints with an MRE score close to zero is generally higher compared to those
with MRE is far from zero. This confirms that the data produced by our method
can support the intended analytic tasks, in addition to permitting accurate query
answering.
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Figure 19: MRE for level 1 utility policy.
Next, we performed a similar experiment for similarity-based and frequency-
based utility policies. The results for the sim 5 policy are shown in Fig. 20.
Note that 81% and 90% of the utility constraints in this policy have an MRE in
[−2.5%, 2.5%] and in [−5%, 5%), respectively and only 3.6% of them have an
MRE in [−21%,−10%). The results for the sup 0.625 utility policy are quanti-
tatively similar, as can be seen in Fig. 21. These results together with those in
Figs. 19 and 20 demonstrate the effectiveness of our method at supporting utility
policies.
In addition, we examined the impact of k on MRE, for different classes of
utility policies. Figs. 22, 23, and 24 illustrate the results for hierarchy-based,
similarity-based, and frequency-based policies, respectively. It can be seen that,
lowering k, helps the production of data that support the specified utility policies.
For instance, 95.3% of hierarchy-based constraints have an MRE in [−5%, 5%)
when k = 2, but 53% of such constraints have an MRE in this interval when
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Figure 20: MRE for the sim 5 utility policy.
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Figure 21: MRE for the sup 0.625 utility policy.
k = 25. This is expected due to the utility/privacy trade-off. However, the MRE
of most of the constraints falls into [−5%, 5%). Thus, our method is effective at
supporting the intended medical analytic tasks.
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Figure 22: MRE for hierarchy-based utility policies and for varying k in [2, 25].
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Figure 23: MRE for similarity-based utility policies and for varying k in [2, 25].
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Figure 24: MRE for frequency-based utility policies and for varying k in [2, 25].
Last, we investigated the effectiveness of our method, when m = 5. It is
interesting to examine data utility in this setting, because a patient’s record in dis-
charge summaries, which may be used in identity disclosure attacks, often con-
tains 5 diagnosis codes, which are assigned during a single hospital visit. Thus,
enforcing k5-anonymity provides protection from such attacks, assuming a worst
case scenario in which data owners do not know which diagnoses codes may be
used by attackers. In our experiments, we considered different classes of utility
policies (namely, level 1, sim 10, and sup 2.5) and report the results in Fig. 25. No-
tice that the data produced by our method remain useful for supporting the utility
policies, as 89%, 93%, and 100% of the tested hierarchy-based, similarity-based,
and frequency-based constraints have an MRE in [−5%, 5%), respectively.
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7. Discussion
This section explains how our approach can be extended to deal with diffe-
rent types of medical data and privacy requirements. In addition, it discusses the
limitations of our approach, which suggest opportunities for further research.
7.1. Dealing with data containing repeated diagnosis codes
Our work considers records comprised of a set of diagnosis codes, following
[34, 36, 35]. However, some applications that aim at identifying phenotypes in
the context of genetic association studies require data, in which a record contains
repeated diagnosis codes (i.e., a multiset of diagnosis codes). Dealing with these
applications is straightforward, as it requires a pre-processing in which different
instances of the same diagnosis code in the dataset, and the utility constraints,
are mapped to different values (e.g., the first occurrence of 250.01 is mapped to
250.011, the second to 250.012 etc.) [35].
7.2. Dealing with different privacy requirements
Our work focuses on preventing identity disclosure which is the most impor-
tant privacy requirement in the healthcare domain. It ensures that an attacker with
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background knowledge of up to m codes in a record cannot associate this record
with fewer than k candidate patients. However, the anonymization framework we
propose is not restricted to guarding against attackers with only partial knowledge
of the codes in a record in D. In fact, by setting m to the maximum number of
codes in a record of D, data owners can prevent attacks based on knowledge of all
codes in a record. This is because the dataset that is produced by our method in this
case satisfies Guarantee 1. Regardless of the specific values of k and m, we do not
consider collaborative attacks, where two or more attackers combine their know-
ledge in order to re-identify a patient nor attackers with background knowledge of
multiple records in D. Such powerful attack schemes can only be handled within
stronger privacy principles, such as differential privacy (see Section 2). However,
applying these principles usually results in significantly lower utility, compared to
the output of our method, which offers a reasonable tradeoff.
Furthermore, we do not assume any distinction between sensitive and non-
sensitive diagnosis codes (see Section 3). Instead, we treat all codes as potentially
identifying. However, when there is clear distinction between sensitive and non-
sensitive codes in a record, i.e., data owners know that some codes (the sensitive
ones) are not known to any attacker, then our framework allows thwarting attri-
bute disclosure as well. An effective principle for preventing attribute disclosure
is ℓ-diversity [41]. Enforcing ℓ-diversity using our framework is rather straight-
forward, as it simply requires (i) ignoring all sensitive codes during the horizontal
partitioning operation, and (ii) placing all sensitive codes in the item chunk during
vertical partitioning. This produces a dataset DA, in which all sensitive codes are
contained in the item chunks. This dataset limits the probability of any association
between sensitive codes and any other subrecord or code to 1
|P |
, where |P | is the
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size of the cluster. Clearly, the desired degree of ℓ-diversity can be achieved in
this case, by adjusting the size of the clusters.
In general, protection from attribute disclosure within our framework tends
to incur higher information loss than simply protecting from identity disclosure.
This is because sensitive codes are not necessarily infrequent, i.e., they may ap-
pear more than k times in a cluster. Thus, the frequent sensitive codes that would
be placed in a km-anonymous record chunk, when only identity disclosure is pre-
vented, are now placed in the item chunk and each of them is completely disas-
sociated from any other. In this case, the utility constraints that include sensitive
codes are not preserved in the published dataset to the extent they would be pre-
served when only guarding against identity disclosure is required. Of course, this
does not hold for the remaining utility constraints. The evaluation of our method
with protection from both identity and attribute disclosure is left as future work.
7.3. Limitations
The proposed approach is limited in three main aspects. First, it considers
data containing diagnosis codes. Some applications, however, require releasing
data that contains both diagnosis codes and demographics. Anonymizing such
data has been considered very recently by Poulis et al. [50] and by Mohammed et
al. [47]. The method in [50] employs generalization and is not directly applicable
to publishing patient information, while the method in [47] employs differential
privacy and releases noisy summary statistics. Extending our approach, so that
it can deal with such data is interesting but very challenging. This is because:
(i) minimizing the information loss for both demographics and diagnosis codes is
computationally infeasible, and (ii) existing optimization strategies do not achieve
a “good” trade-off between the information loss in these two attribute types. For
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example, as proved in [50], to construct a dataset with the minimum information
loss in demographics, we need to apply generalization to “small” groups of re-
cords independently, but we must apply generalization to all records in the dataset,
to minimize information loss in diagnosis codes. The reason is that demographics
and diagnosis codes have different semantics; a patient is associated with a fixed,
typically small, number of demographics, but with a large number of diagnosis
codes, that is not the same for all patients.
Second, as is true of all data anonymization methods, our approach assumes
that data owners are able to select appropriate values for k and m. Configuring
these parameters to find the “best” trade-off between data utility and privacy is,
however, not straightforward. For example, if the dataset is “too” small and con-
tains a “large” number of “rare” diagnosis codes, applying km-anonymity with
“large” k and m values may incur high information loss. It is therefore important
to develop tools that help data owners in assessing data utility and privacy, so as
to achieve a “good” utility/privacy trade-off.
Third, although our approach improves upon existing work in terms of mini-
mizing information loss, it does not guarantee that the information loss will be
bounded from the optimal. The design of approximation algorithms that offer
such guarantees is an important open problem, which is challenging due to its
computational hardness [37].
8. Conclusions
Ensuring that diagnosis codes cannot be used in identity disclosure attacks is
necessary but challenging, particularly when data need to be shared broadly and
to support a range of medical analytic tasks that may not be determined prior to
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data dissemination. To this end, we proposed a novel, disassociation-based appro-
ach that enforces km-anonymity with low information loss. Our approach does
not require data owners to specify diagnosis codes, as existing methods do, and
takes into account analytic tasks that published data are intended for. Extensive
experiments using EHR data show that our approach can produce data that permit
various types of clinical case count studies and general medical analysis tasks to
be performed accurately.
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